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Point Fire, 1995
&
Island Fork Fire, 1999
dedication


Point Fire Case Study


Point Fire Accident Investigation

A. Point Fire Overview

B. Investigation

C. Recommendations

D. Supporting Data

  • Sequence of Events
  • Organization Charts
  • Site Investigation
  • Fire Behavior Report
  • Property Damage Report
  • Witness Statements
  • Outline of Kuna Wildland Training Provided by BLM

E. Records and Reports

  • Preplanned Dispatch
  • BLM Radio Transmission Log
  • Ada County Dispatch Log
  • Fire Incident Status Summary
  • Escaped Fire Situation Analysis
  • Wildland Fire Entrapment Report
  • Technical Analysis of Personal Protective Equipment
  • Vehicle Inspection
  • Weather Reports

F. Glossary

      ——————

Island Fork Fire Accident Investigation

  ——————

Island Fork Fire, NIOSH Report


Point Fire — U.S. District Court Civil Case

Ruling on I.C.'s Decisions - Nov. 10, 1998
 • Factual Background
 • Legal Analysis

Ruling on BLM Liability - Feb. 19, 1999
 • 
Findings of Fact
 • Legal Standards
 • Analysis

Ruling on Public Safety Officer Benefits (PSOB)

      ——————

Surviving Fire Entrapments

      ——————

Colorado Firecamp extends special thanks to Linda Perkins, BLM Idaho State FOIA Coordinator, for her friendly assistance in gathering the Point Fire documents. BLM FOIA Letter

 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

DEANNA C. BUTTRAM, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

Civil Case No. 96-0324-S-BLW
(Consolidated with)
Civil Case No. 96-0452-S-LMB
Civil Case No. 97-0129-S-BLW


Introduction

The Court has before it the Government's motion to amend judgment. In a Judgment filed February 19, 1999, the Court awarded plaintiffs $751,712.28 in their wrongful death suit brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Government seeks to reduce that judgment by the sums plaintiffs received under the Public Safety Officers Death Benefits Act (PSODBA). The Court will deny the motion, and explains its reasoning below.

Analysis

When a fireman dies in the line of duty, the Government pays his survivors a death benefit under PSODBA, 42 U.S.C. § 3796. In this case, each of the four plaintiffs—Deanna and Jeremiah Buttram, Darla Reber, and Michael Oliver—received $65,208 pursuant to PSODBA.

The Government cannot be forced to pay twice for the same injury. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (holding that FTCA judgment must be reduced by the amount of veteran's benefits received). If the FTCA award and the PSODBA payments compensated the Buttrams for the same elements of damage, the FTCA award must be reduced by the amount of the PSODBA payments. See Pike v. United States, 652 F.2d 31, 34 (9th Cir. 1981). In Pike, the Circuit refused to reduce an FTCA award by the amount of veteran's benefits received by the plaintiff. The Circuit observed that while the FTCA award did not include any sum for loss of financial support, the veteran's benefits did cover that loss. In other words, the two awards were designed to compensate for different elements of damage. Because the Government was not paying for the same injury twice, the Circuit refused to reduce the FTCA award by the amount of the veteran's benefits.

To apply Pike here, the Court must determine whether the FTCA award and the PSODBA payments were designed to compensate the plaintiffs for the same elements of damage. While it is clear that the FTCA award covered both economic and noneconomic losses, the PSODBA payments are tougher to categorize. The PSODBA statute and regulations say nothing about whether benefit payments are designed to compensate survivors for economic or noneconomic losses. While the original PSODBA statute required proof of dependency by parents in order for parents to receive an award, amendments deleted this requirement. This explains why Darla Reber and Michael Oliver received PSODBA payments even though their son Josh Oliver was not supporting them financially. In addition, there is no requirement of economic need, and the payment is not tied in any way to the deceased's salary, as were the veteran's benefits in Pike. These are all clear indications that PSODBA payments are designed at least in part to compensate for noneconomic losses.

The legislative history gives mixed signals. During the debate, legislators referred to the survivors' financial distress caused by poor pension and life insurance programs that local governments provided for public safety officers, e.g. Congressional Record at 12007 (April 30, 1976), and also referred to the need to compensate survivors for the "loss of companionship. " Id. at 12011.

When this legislative history is read together with the statute itself, it sounds like Congress decided to pay PSODBA benefits to help survivors with economic and noneconomic losses. It is impossible, however, to allocate any benefit paid to an individual between these two elements of damage. But an allocation is necessary for two reasons: (1) The FTCA award to Darla Reber and Michael Oliver covered only noneconomic losses, and thus any portion of the PSODBA payment that was designed to compensate them for economic losses cannot be subtracted from the FTCA award; and (2) While the FTCA award compensates the Buttrams fully for their economic losses, it does not do so for their noneconomic losses, and thus any portion of the PSODBA payments that was intended to compensate the Buttrams for their noneconomic loss cannot be subtracted from the FTCA award. The Court will explain this further below, beginning with the Buttrams' case.

The FTCA award does not compensate the Buttrams fully for their noneconomic loss because the Idaho cap on those damages reduced the award from $900,000 to $590,291.26 for both Deanna Buttram and Jeremiah Buttram. In other words, each Buttram was shorted $309,708.74 in noneconomic loss. Without the cap, the Government and the Kuna RFD would have divided responsibility for that shortfall, with the Government responsible for 35%, or $108,398.06 for each Buttram.

It would seem particularly anomalous to require the Buttrams to return their PSODBA payments, a portion of which was designed to compensate them for noneconomic loss, when the FTCA judgment leaves part of that loss uncompensated. There is nothing that ties the PSODBA payment to the Government's liability limits - in fact, the Supreme Court has described the PSODBA payment as a "gratuity." Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 4 (1986). It is much more fair, and more in keeping with the policy behind the PSODBA, to permit the Buttrams to keep that portion of the PSODBA payments designed to compensate them for noneconomic loss up to the amount of their noneconomic loss that is not covered by the FTCA judgment, $108,398.06 each.

A different analysis applies to the Buttram's economic loss award. The FTCA judgment was designed to fully compensate the Buttrams for their economic loss, so that portion of the PSODBA payment representing compensation for economic loss must be subtracted from the FTCA award for economic loss.

This is not true, however, for Reber and Oliver, whose FTCA awards contained nothing for economic loss. Thus, that portion of their PSODBA payments representing compensation for economic loss do not constitute a double recovery to Reber and Oliver. With regard to the FTCA award for noneconomic loss, Reber and Oliver did not have their award reduced by the Idaho cap, and thus they have no uncompensated loss here as did the Buttrams. Reber and Oliver must therefore return that portion of the PSODBA payments representing noneconomic loss.

This analysis shows that it is crucial to identify what portion of the PSODBA payment was designed to compensate for economic loss, and what portion was designed to compensate for noneconomic loss. The Buttrams are entitled to keep that portion of the PSODBA payment representing noneconomic loss, but must return that portion representing economic loss. It is exactly the opposite for Reber and Oliver: They must return that portion of the PSODBA payments representing noneconomic loss, but are entitled to keep that portion representing economic loss.

However, as crucial as apportionment is, the Government cannot make an apportionment. There is simply no way to allocate the PSODBA payment between economic and noneconomic loss. It is the Government's motion, and hence the Government's burden to show that it is paying twice for the same injury. The Government cannot carry its burden, and thus the Court must deny the motion. see footnote #1

Order

In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set out above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to amend (docket no. 236) is hereby DENIED.

Dated this 12th day of August, 1999.

/s/ B. LYNN WINMILL
CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

footnote

footnote #1 While there was some briefing addressing whether the PSODBA payment was a collateral source, the parties eventually recognized that the payment came from the Government and hence was not a collateral source as far as the Government was concerned under Idaho law, Idaho Code § 6-1606. In other circumstances, state collateral source rules have been applied to the Government in FTCA cases where (1) the payment comes from a specially funded source distinct from the unsegregated general revenues of the Federal Treasury, see U.S. v. Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 ( 9th Cir. 1960), or (2) the plaintiff contributed to the Government payment. See Overton v. U.S., 619 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1980). There is no evidence that either of these circumstances is present here.

 


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