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NIOSH Cedar Fire Report

Summary

Introduction

Investigation & Medical Findings

Recommendations / Discussions

References

Glossary of Terms

Maps and Photographs


CDF Cedar Fire Report

Table of Contents

Review Team Process

Overview of Accident

Summary of Events

Sequence of Events

Findings

Causal Factors

Contributory Factors

Circumstances

Site Conditions

Graphics – List of Illustrations Table

Description of Supporting Data and Supplementary Information


Novato FPD Investigation Analysis

Table of Contents

Prologue

CDF Green Sheet

Overview

Lessons Learned

Draft Standard Operating Procedures

Inaja Fire Tragedy

Acknowledgements

 

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
Review Report of Serious CDF Injuries, Illnesses, Accidents and Near-Miss Incidents


Engine Crew Entrapment, Fatality, and Burn Injuries

October 29, 2003
Cedar Fire
CACNF-003056
CACSR-000132
Southern Region


SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

On October 28, 2003, Battalion Chief John Michelini is assigned as the Structure Group Supervisor for the Julian Structure Group. According to Michelini, throughout the day, units are deployed in and around structures south of Highway 78/79. He observes that at about 5:00 p.m., the fire’s northern spread has been stopped between Pine Hills Road and Wynola. Open line continues to burn between Wynola Estates and Santa Ysabel below Highway 78/79. [1] By late afternoon, the Cedar Fire, under an onshore wind influence has burned northeast up the San Diego River drainage to just southwest of Highway 78/79.

At about 6:00 p.m., Branch III Director Randy Lyle advises Structure Group Supervisor Michelini that the Command Team wants a black line to be brought down from Pine Hills Road to Santa Ysabel along Highway 78/79. His objective is to fire-out around structures, burn-out islands, and create a control line along Highway 78/79, from Pine Hills Road to Santa Ysabel, a distance of approximately seven miles. Based on this request, Michelini initiates a firing-out operation, which takes most of the night. [1]

Strike Team (S/T) Leader Thomas Keating with S/T XST 4205A is assigned the firing-out operation by Structure Group Supervisor Michelini. Michelini tells Keating that the fire is moving towards the Inaja Memorial and that he needs to go “fire-out the canyon so that the fire does not cross Highway 78/79.” When S/T Leader Keating arrives at his assignment at Riverwood Road and the Inaja Memorial, he “(feels) uncomfortable with the order to back-fire the canyon.” [2]

S/T Leader Keating notes that the fire is already at the bottom of the canyon but has not burned clean. He requests that Michelini come to his location and confirm what he wants before they put fire on the ground. While waiting for Michelini, Keating is joined by S/T Leader Allen Chandler and Strike Team 1624C. This is a mixed strike team mostly of U.S. Forest Service engines. S/T Leader Chandler tells Keating that he also has concerns about burning out this area.

Keating discusses the situation with Structure Group Supervisor Michelini, and he and S/T Leader Chandler decide they can safely fire this area out. The firing operation in the area of Highway 78/79 and Riverwood Road begins at about 1:00 a.m. on October 29. Keating observes that the burning-out operation between Riverwood Road and the Inaja Memorial goes well and the fire burns all the way to the bottom of the canyon. [2]

The firing operation follows Riverwood Road and progresses to where it returns to Highway 78/79 on the west side of the San Diego River. This action leaves an unburned island of fuel between Riverwood Road and Highway 78/79 near the bottom of the San Diego River drainage. The firing then progresses from the Inaja Memorial back towards Riverwood Road, completing this section at about 6:00 a.m. Structure Group Supervisor Michelini notes that all firing-out is completed by 6:00 a.m. with the exception of the area from the Inaja Memorial to Santa Ysabel. [1]

S/T Leader Watkins (XAL 2005A) attends the morning briefing at 7:00 a.m. in camp. The Incident Action Plans (IAP) are late in printing and only show up midway through the briefing. Incident Commander John Hawkins and Planning Section Chief Ed Kilmartin conduct the briefing. After roll call, Watkins is told that S/T 2005A is assigned to Branch III, Division I. Chief Hawkins identifies for Watkins the location where he can meet with Division I. [3]

S/T Leader Watkins meets with Division I, Dan Runnestrand, and is given a brief overview of their assignment. He and his strike team are to meet Runnestrand at Santa Ysabel as soon as possible. Watkins returns to his strike team to find them fully prepared and ready to move out. He conducts a briefing with the strike team, tells them of the assignment and passes on safety information. At about this time, additional King radios have come into the communications unit and the strike team spends time obtaining and re-cloning radios. [3]

According to Michelini he is contacted by S/T Leader Chandler, USFS S/T 1624C, by 7:00 a.m. and he advises him that they have initiated firing-out from the Inaja Memorial towards Santa Ysabel but have extinguished the firing operation due to unsettled conditions. [1]

S/T Leader Keating observes that after about twenty minutes of firing out, S/T Leader Chandler calls a halt to the firing operation. Keating notes that there has been a wind change and the fire is coming out of the canyon faster than they had anticipated. His strike team then leaves the area to seek mechanical repairs. [2]

Branch Director Ray Chaney meets with Deputy Branch III at Santa Ysabel at about 8:15 a.m. and observes the fire bumping Highway 78/79, near the Inaja Memorial. They advise CHP to close traffic to the area.4 By the time Structure Group Supervisor Michelini arrives at the firing-out operation on Highway 78/79, between the Inaja Memorial and Santa Ysabel, S/T 1624C with S/T Leader Chandler and S/T 4205A with S/T Leader Keating, have completely knocked down the back fire and are cleaning up the area. [1] Chandler later tells Keating that after he has left the scene for repairs, the fire “blow(s) over his crew and Highway 78/79. [2]

Air Tactical Group Supervisor Ray Sauceda is assigned to Branch III of the Cedar Fire along with three fixed wing air tankers. He is on scene at about 8:30 a.m. He makes a request for helicopters to support ground operations, and then determines that he cannot communicate with the ground resources. This leads him to believe that the communications plan is not in effect with all the resources. He then orders the helicopters to hold on base and tells the fixed wing to return to base until Branch III can confirm they have communications. All air assets return to base. [5]

Sauceda’s understanding of the communications problem was “that crews on the ground thought that they were using yesterday’s Com Plan.” Crews on the ground at that time were still there from the previous days’ shift and were using the October 28 IAP; however according to Sauceda, the IAP for October 29 clearly shows a change. [5] Review of the IAPs for October 28 and 29, indicates that the only change in the communications plan was in the Command Net (Air-to-Ground and Branch III Tactical nets were the same)]. [109] Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., the main fire crosses Highway 78/79 just west of the Inaja Memorial. Both S/T Leader Chandler and Structure Group Supervisor Michelini note that the firing operations are all secure prior to this event and that the fire that spots across the Highway is a run of the main fire. Chandler says that the fire spots into light grass on the east side of the Highway and immediately starts running up the ridge. He commits his entire strike team to pick up the fire on the east side, but due to erratic fire behavior they have to leave the line. [6]

At about 9:00 a.m. on October 29, the backing fire (main fire) is well established across the draw below Highway 78/79 and spreads rapidly up the slope out of the drainage and across Highway 78/79. Structure Group Supervisor Michelini briefs his relief who is Division I, Dan Runnestrand, along with the incoming Branch III Director, Ray Chaney. He then goes to Ramona. [1]

Division I Runnestrand is briefed by the night shift and afterwards makes plans to find an anchor point and use bulldozers to work the west flank of the “slop-over” that has crossed Highway 78/79. At this time he describes the “slop-over” as running north high on the west ridge above the San Diego River. He observes the wind is out of the south-southeast, at about five to seven mph. [7]


Engine 6162 crew at Santa Ysabel on the morning of Oct. 29, 2003; Left to right: Firefighter Barrett Smith, Engineer Shawn Kreps, Engineer Steve Rucker and Captain Doug McDonald.

Strike Team 2005A with Engine 6162 which is assigned to Branch III, Division I, arrives at Santa Ysabel at about 9:15 a.m. [8] At first, Strike Team Leader Jim Watkins cannot find anyone from Division I.

Division I Runnestrand, who has been busy talking about a bulldozer operation finally arrives, and he and S/T Leader Watkins talk again. Runnestrand gives Watkins a “pretty good briefing on the fire activity the day before, what was goin’ on, what to expect.” [9]

Branch III Director Chaney meets with Division I Runnestrand at about 9:30 a.m. and instructs him to start a direct attack on the fire that has crossed Highway 78/79. After re-evaluating, Chaney directs Division I to move resources to the right or southern flank, establish an anchor point and go direct with suppression efforts heading east in a flanking action to keep the fire from moving south towards Julian. [4]

Also present during the briefing is CDF Fire Captain (FC) John Childe and CDF Fire Apparatus Engineer (FAE) Isaac Sanchez. FC Childe offers up his assistance to do some scouting for Branch III Chaney.10 FC Childe tells Chaney that he is going to conduct some scouting in the Schoolhouse Road area. [11]

Deputy Branch III, Mike Wakoski, also speaks with FC Childe during this briefing. FC Childe introduces himself to Wakoski as the leader of a firing team. According to Wakoski, FC Childe also tells him that he is a liaison between the Paradise Fire and the Cedar Fire. [12]

S/T Leader Watkins notices during the briefing a CDF Fire Captain, (later identified as FC Childe [13]) who “interject(s) rather enthusiastically about doing some burning operations around the dozer… he (is) trying to convince the Division I Supervisor that you need to start puttin’ some fire on the ground.” S/T Leader Watkins says that the Fire Captain is “pretty aggressive about it.” Watkins thinks the Fire Captain is badgering the Division Supervisor who has listened to Childe, and is tired of it. Watkins says that the Fire Captain is not budging off his position even though the Division Supervisor has incorporated some of his suggestions into the plan. [14]

Division I Runnestrand states that during the briefing, FC Childe “(has) lots of ideas on how I should fight this fire, and, you know, which is not atypical when you have somebody that’s just out freelancing, lots of ideas.” During this conversation, according to Runnestrand, FC Childe makes it clear that he does not work for Division I and is not assigned to the division. [15]

FC Childe then leaves that location and conducts scouting in the Schoolhouse Road area where he runs into the leader of a U. S. Forest Service hand crew. [11]

According to rough estimates by Division I Runnestrand, and Pilot Hunter Ridenour, (Tactical map by Runnestrand in evidence, and drawing by Pilot Hunter Ridenour in Tab Section 57 of Attachments) by late morning the fire has crossed Highway 78/79 and is burning in a northern direction up the ridge on the west side of the San Diego River drainage. The fire has spread along this ridge about one half to three-quarters of a mile past Highway 78/79. The fire is making short runs in the grass, brush and oak trees in the area during the late morning.

Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Air Tactical Group Supervisor Ray Sauceda returns to Branch III after clearing up the communications plan with Branch III. It is agreed that helicopter support can be called for down to the Division Supervisor level, unless it is an emergency. [5]


Slop-over Fire after it crossed Highway 78/79; viewed from Santa Ysabel by the crew of Engine 6162. Photo taken by Firefighter-Paramedic Barrett Smith at 9:47 a.m. on 10/29/03.

At 9:47 a.m., S/T 2005A with Novato Engine 6162 observes the fire that has crossed Highway 78/79 between Santa Isabel and the Inaja Memorial. (See photo above) By about 10:20 a.m., S/T 2005A is assigned to do structure protection in the Riverwood Estates. At 10:22 a.m., Firefighter-Paramedic Smith on Engine 6162 takes photos as they drive through the slop-over area. (See photo next page)

When Firefighter-Paramedic Smith [16] and Engineer Kreps [17], arrive in the Riverwood Estates, the find that the area around the structures has been fired-out and begin mop-up operations. Both watch as the fire burns to the west in the distance where the fire has jumped the highway and is now northwest of Highway 78/79. The fire is calm in the Riverwood Estates area.

While the crew of Engine 6162 is doing structure protection in the Riverwood Estates, Captain McDonald has a discussion with members of the crew, including Engineer Rucker, concerning the use of hose packs. Captain McDonald states that if there is a need to protect the structure, they will extend the deployed hose lines with the first 100 feet of a 200 foot wildland hose pack.94 According to the apparatus inventory, these packs are located in the rear compartment of Engine 6162.


Engine 6162 driving through the slop-over area on Highway 78/79.

From his location in the Riverwood Estates, S/T Leader Watkins can see the fire burning on the other side of Highway 78/79. He describes the fire across the highway as being pushed along the hill slowly by the wind. He also describes the smoke column, at about 1,000 feet, as having the top going back over them to the east. [9]

Captain Michael Carpenter on Engine 24 of S/T 2005A and his crew are assigned by S/T Leader Watkins to protect a house on the east side of Highway 78/79, about one quarter mile north of its junction with Riverwood Road. They arrive at this location and while preparing the house, watch the fire across Highway 78/79 as it backs down the ridge towards the Highway. This house is located in the unburned island between Riverwood Road and Highway 78/79. [18]

S/T Leader Watkins deploys his strike team and then meets up with S/T 2004A who have shown up at their location. S/T 2004A cannot find the Division Supervisor so Watkins has them join in doing structure protection. Watkins attempts but is unable to contact Division I by radio and inform him. Shortly after this, S/T 1286A also arrives. [19]


Looking west from Riverwood Estates towards the slop-over above Highway 78/79 at 10:56 a.m. on October 29, 2003. Photo taken by Firefighter-Paramedic Barrett Smith.

Deputy Branch III Mike Wakoski meets with Division I Runnestrand, at about 11:00 a.m. to reallocate resources in an effort to cut-off the spread of the slop-over towards Wynola and Julian. [20] Plans are made to use bulldozers to build fire line around the fire on the north side of the highway. Bulldozers that were deployed to the west flank are moved towards the east flank. S/T Leader Watkins goes to recon the area and finds Division I Runnestrand, out on Highway 78/79 along with another staff member (believed to be Deputy Branch III). Watkins advises Runnestrand about the presence of S/T 2004A. Runnestrand says that he has been trying to raise them on the radio. During this meeting, Runnestrand tells Watkins that he needs them to move to Orchard Lane. [3]

Several helicopters, including 523 EH piloted by Hunter Ridenour, arrive about 11:35 a.m. and start making bucket drops along a dirt road on the east side of the San Diego River (dry at this time) just to the north of where Highway 78/79 crosses the river. The objective of this action is to try to keep the fire on the west side of the San Diego River drainage and away from structures in the area. [21] Instructions from the Air Tactical Group Supervisor are for them to choose their own drop points with priority to protect structures. Pilot Ridenour observes the wind at that location to be “strong out of the southwest up the draw and onto the ridge to the east.” [5]

Ron Mitchell, a resident at 1126 Orchard Lane, has stayed at his home to protect it from the fire on the morning of October 29th. He observes the fire from a lookout point on the west side of his property. Mitchell sees the fire burning on the west ridge across the canyon from his residence. He describes the wind as being out of the south and the fire spread to the north. Mitchell describes the fire as not burning very fast and he observes the flames going straight up. The smoke column is going up and then blowing to the northeast along the ridge. He estimates the fire (early on) is not yet below the mid-point of the ridge but is burning slowly towards the bottom of the canyon. There is blue sky above him with only a little wind at his home. He observes that the leaves in the trees are barely moving. [22]

During this time, the fire on the west side of the drainage has moved up-canyon and gained elevation. Coming under the influence of a west wind running perpendicular to the ridge top, the fire higher in the drainage spreads to the northeast. Burning to and past the northeast corner of the property located at 902 Orchard Lane and leaving spot fires near the southeast flank. The fire has now established itself on the eastern side of the drainage in a hooking move to the northeast.

Mr. Mitchell, still at his residence on Orchard Lane, observes that at about noontime the winds start to change and are coming directly out of the west. He sees the fire move down into the canyon bottom from the west ridge and “start(ed) shooting up” to the north of his location. [22]

S/T 2005A is grouped up again to begin its move towards the Orchard Lane area. Engine 24, still at the house about one quarter mile north of Riverwood Road on Highway 78/79, observes that the fire has almost burned down to the highway. At this time, the strike team drives by and Engine 24 falls into line behind them. [3] Engine 334 goes to a hydrant to top off its tank.

At about 11:45 a.m. S/T Leader Watkins drives north on Orchard Lane [23] while S/T 2005A is staged at the intersection of Orchard Lane and Highway 78/79. Active fire behavior is observed to the north end of Orchard Lane. As he drives up Orchard Lane, the S/T Leader for 2005A realizes that it is a long road and he calls back for the strike team to start moving up. S/T Leader Watkins can see the fire coming and knows that time is short. [24]

Prior to 11:50 a.m. and during an approach to the area in the bottom of the canyon near Highway 78/79, the pilot of helicopter 523 EH Hunter Ridenour, observes spot fires burning near the northeast corner of the structure at 902 Orchard Lane. The pilot calls air attack and informs him of the spot fires. The helicopter operation is then moved to the ridge on the east side of the drainage where residences on Orchard Lane are being threatened by a flanking fire. [21]


Post fire view of Orchard Lane looking north. Vehicles parked on side of the road are located just to the south of the driveway at 930 and 920 Orchard Lane.

At about 11:50 a.m., S/T 2005A arrives near 915 Orchard Lane.23 S/T Leader Watkins begins to scout structure locations beginning with 902 Orchard Lane. At that location, Watkins lets his assistant out to recon the area by the water tank and he goes to the house. He observes that the house is at the end of the road, has a narrow access, and needs too much prep work. He writes this house off as not defendable. [25]

Captain McDonald on Engine 6162 orders his engine backed up to get to a better location along the road due to the fire activity he sees ahead of them. The other units of the S/T back up with them. [25] The Crew of Engine 6162 identifies the fields to the east as a safety zone.

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez in Utility 3334 arrive at Orchard Lane and see bulldozers coming from the southwest on Highway 78. FC Childe has heard that the bulldozers are being turned down Orchard Lane and he has a safety concern with that due to the fire activity that he sees down Orchard Lane. He does not convey this concern to anyone else except FAE Sanchez. [26]

The two bulldozers that FC Childe sees are a Los Angeles County Fire Department bulldozer operated by Jeff Vidrinskas and a Los Angles City Fire Department bulldozer. The two bulldozers off-load near Orchard Lane and Highway 78/79 and begin to “walk” through the meadow towards the north end of Orchard Lane. [107]

At about 11:55 a.m. the S/T Leader for 2005A, after reviewing home locations, begins assigning engines to structure protection.23According to S/T Leader Watkins, Engine 334 remains unassigned as they have just returned from filling up at a hydrant. [27]

Because it is the first strike team assignment for Engine 1541, S/T Leader Watkins assigns them to a large metal building at 915 Orchard Lane, on the east side of the road. [28] They take up a position to protect this farm building which is said to have pesticides stored in it.

Engine 6162 is assigned to 920 Orchard Lane, the second home from the north on Orchard Lane. S/T Leader Watkins discusses with Captain McDonald the placement of the engine, the need to deploy hoses, and to clear out the area. He says that Captain McDonald and his crew state they are comfortable with that. [29]


Looking up the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane from its intersection with Orchard Lane.

Captain McDonald on Engine 6162 orders Engineer Kreps to back the engine up the cement driveway at 920 Orchard Lane. He then walks up the driveway ahead of the engine to evaluate the location. Firefighter-Paramedic Smith on Engine 6162 and Engineer Rucker are cutting brush, which is hanging over the sides of the cement driveway, and directing the backing of the engine. [30]

S/T Leader Watkins rejects putting an engine at 930 Orchard Lane as it is too risky. This is the third residence from the north and directly south of the residence where Engine 6162 is assigned. [31]

Engine 24 (E5228) from Vallejo is assigned structure protection at 1038 Orchard Lane. The house at 1126 Orchard Lane is skipped and Engine 71 is assigned to the next house to the south. [32]

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez, in Utility 3334, drive north on Orchard Lane, passing Engines 24 and 71 on Orchard Lane near the driveway of 930 and 920 Orchard Lane. The two engines are headed south to their assigned locations. [33] , [114] Engine 334 is parked in a driveway on the east side of the road as FC Childe and FAE Sanchez pass. FAE Sanchez is video taping as they go, and the driveway to 920 Orchard Lane is clearly visible in the video as they pass that location. [114] When FC Childe passes the engines on the road, he then determines that he is going to fire-out. [34]

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez continue north on Orchard Lane and observe an engine (1541) parked near 915 Orchard Lane. Once again FC Childe states that he has a safety concern about the bulldozers and engines coming in to do work in the area, [114] , [35] There is no indication that he ever conveys that concern to anyone else. FC Childe drives around the engines. Both FC Childe and FAE Sanchez express their concern about the engines being able to hold Orchard Lane and state to each other that they should just get out. [114]

S/T Leader Watkins observes the Fire Captain that he has seen earlier at the briefing in Santa Ysabel, drive past in a utility and go up towards 902 Orchard Lane.36 FC Childe and FAE Sanchez in Utility 3334 see fire beyond the northernmost approach to 902 Orchard Lane, so they turn a hard left up the first drive at 914 Orchard Lane. [114]

While FAE Sanchez sits in the truck, FC Childe parks near the southwest corner of the driveway and video tapes the fire that passes the property from the southwest to the northeast. Small torching activity is visible 114 in the immediate area with most of the fire spread being past the property on the north side. FC Childe describes the main fire as having passed and local flame lengths are about 25-30 feet. Observing the fire spread that is now flanking across the slope to the southeast, [37] FC Childe initiates a firing action around the residence. [114] , [38]

According to the ICS-214 for FC Childe, he and FAE Sanchez begin to take “Independent Action on structure protection.” [39] FC Childe gives FAE Sanchez instructions to fire-out around 902 Orchard Lane. FAE Sanchez gets into the rear of the truck and prepares a drip torch. He then goes to the west side of the residence and begins to fire out. FAE Sanchez has no radio. [40]

FC Childe has given FAE Sanchez the only HT (it is unknown when). [41] According to FC Childe, the firing-out is just ahead of the fire at all times. [42] FC Childe continues to describe the main fire as banking southeasterly towards the structures. He states that the fire activity “was great until we start(ed) dropping fire and then they started to pick up and started to flame…” [43]

FC Childe in Utility 3334 returns to Orchard Lane alone, [44] and instructs Engine 334 to go to the residence at 902 Orchard Lane and do structure protection in support of his firing-out operation. [42] (FC Childe later states that during the firing-out operation, “I was watching him, what he was doing, making certain that he was in visual contact with me all the time. And you know, we did that for each structure.”) [45]

FC Childe makes face to face contact with the Strike Team Leader of S/T 1286A and tells him of his intentions to fire-out around the residence and the need for an engine. Childe says that the S/T Leader tells him that they are on White 3 as a tactical channel. FC Childe says that he later finds out, after unsuccessfully trying to communicate with the S/T Leader, that it was White 3 on the 800 MHz and he only had VHF. [46] FC Childe states that there was not a lot of communication going on that he could hear and he was “getting a little bit unnerved.” [47]

S/T Leader Watkins sees FC Childe walk by and hears him say, “you need to start puttin’ fire down on the ground or you’re gonna start losin’ houses.” [48] Engine 334 calls S/T Leader Watkins and advises him of the instructions from FC Childe.

S/T Leader Watkins, believing that FC Childe is going to coordinate and work with Engine 334, tells the crew to go ahead and support the firing-out operation. It is days later when Watkins finds out that the crew of Engine 334 thought FC Childe was coordinating the firing-out with the S/T Leader. Conversely, Watkins thought that FC Childe was going to remain to assist Engine 334. [39]

S/T Leader Watkins observe a U. S. Forest Service hand crew (El Cariso Hot Shots) and some bulldozers (LA County) go past him to the north on Orchard Lane. S/T Leader Watkins assumes the crew and bulldozers, who are going to work the edge of the fire, are coordinating their efforts with the firing-out operation. [50]

At 11:57 a.m. Engine 24 arrives at 1038 Orchard Lane. [23] They observe no visible fire near the structure. Captain Mike Carpenter hikes about 300 yards uphill behind the house and never sees any fire. The crew can see a column further north down Orchard Lane, moving from west to east. [51]

Captain McDonald returns to Engine 6162 after assessing the situation and expresses some concern about the conditions. Captain McDonald radios S/T Leader Watkins and advises him that he does not think the house is defendable. S/T Leader Watkins tells them to come out. According to Captain McDonald he returns to review the situation with Firefighter-Paramedic Smith and Engineer Rucker. [52] At the top of the driveway, they can see smoke from the fire to the north near 902 Orchard Lane, and determine it to be the primary threat. They observed it to be a flanking fire. [54]

Captain McDonald, Engineer Rucker and Firefighter-Paramedic Smith walk to the end of the driveway past the front of the residence, which faces west towards the San Diego River drainage below. After a review of the location they find that brush had been cleared away to the west of the residence for about 150 feet and a decision to deploy at this location is made. This clearance of brush provides for a view across the canyon to the west and northwest. Tall brush and drifting smoke restrict the view to the southwest. [55]

The prominent fire in view at this time is still the flanking fire to the north near 902 Orchard Lane. Small runs of fire are taking place across the canyon on the west side of the drainage as it backs down into the bottom of the canyon. No fire activity is visible to the southwest. The crew of Engine 6162 observes that there is a wind blowing up-canyon and upslope on a line from where Highway 78/79 crosses the San Diego River towards the location of 902 Orchard Lane, a natural saddle. Wind speeds are estimated at 7-10 mph. [54]

After Engine 6162 arrives at the top of the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane, the crew conducts a briefing with Captain McDonald laying out the plan of deployment and preparation. An axe is placed at the rear door in preparation for forced entry should it be needed. A chain saw is placed on a cement patio at the south end of the house after doing some additional brush clearing. The roof is laddered near the front door using one found at the residence. [57]

The front bumper line is charged and prepared as an engine protection line should they have to drive out under fire conditions. Two, 100 foot long, one and one-half inch hose lines are deployed and charged to protect the structure. These hoses are attached off the rear wye discharge and are placed to the passenger side of the engine. [57]

FAE Sanchez completes firing around 902 Orchard Lane. He has fired from south to north along the west side of the residence. FAE Sanchez walks back to where the utility is parked and finds both it and FC Childe gone. He walks cross-country down the hill to Orchard Lane where he sees Engine 334 coming up the driveway. He turns and walks back up with the engine. [58]

At about this time, CDF Copter 202, with Captain Jesse Scofield on board, tries to contact Engine 334 on Air-to-Ground. Captain Scofield observes that the winds at his elevation are blowing hard out of the west and beginning to change to the northwest. [59]

Captain Scofield observes what he thinks are backfires below and close to the houses on the ridge. He sees firefighters working them with hoses. He later decides that they were spot fires as they were “round, not narrow.” He returns to base for fuel and is not able to reach any ground resources on Air-to-Ground before he leaves. [59]

FC Childe returns with the utility and rejoins FAE Sanchez. The two, after trying to fire out around an outbuilding, drive out to Orchard Lane. With FAE Sanchez in the rear of the utility, they proceed south on Orchard Lane and up the driveway towards 930 Orchard Lane. [60]

FAE Sanchez recalls going to this location and during a field interview with Investigator Alan Carlson, describes his actions at this location. FAE Sanchez admits that FC Childe videotaped him burning at this location. [61] , [114]

FC Childe says that he did not go up the driveway to 930 Orchard Lane. After walking up there with investigators he states that he has no memory of burning out in that location. [62]

The crew of Engine 6162 does additional work preparing the residence for the on-coming flanking fire from the north including the cutting and removal of additional brush from the area behind the engine. The engine is moved back about ten feet to avoid subjecting it to heat from a brush pile the crew burns below the driveway. [63]

S/T Leader Watkins and his assistant arrive at about 12:25 p.m. at 930 Orchard Lane to reevaluate the use of an engine at that location. Shortly after their arrival, FC Childe and FAE Sanchez in Utility 3334 arrive. Childe instructs FAE Sanchez to begin firing-out the area around the structures. This firing is observed by S/T Leader Watkins to be about 100-150 feet away from the structures and appears to him to be “too big of a bite as the fire (gets) into the brush and (begins) making a run towards the driveway.” A helicopter makes a drop on this fire and slows it down. Utility 3334 is blocking their means of egress. [64]

After FAE Sanchez fires out from south to north along the west side of the structures at 930 Orchard Lane, FC Childe instructs FAE Sanchez to take the line of fire to the next house to the north, which is 920 Orchard Lane. FC Childe is video taping this. [114] , [65]

In a later interview, FC Childe states, “I’m sure there was nothing between me and what I was firing out because the fire was just way too close to these structures that I was, you know, droppin’ fire behind, you know, it just was there. And if there was any engines out there, they were trapped maybe before I even got there.” [66]

Evidence indicates that at the time that FC Childe and FAE Sanchez fired-out at 930 Orchard Lane, the main fire was still flanking in the area of 902 Orchard Lane. Engine 6162 at 920 Orchard Lane was between FC Childes’ firing operation and the main fire. (See later sequence of events, firing out at 920 Orchard Lane.)

The firing-out operation at 930 Orchard Lane quickly generates fire spread towards the east which is knocked down by the helicopter water drop. [64] The video tape taken by FC Childe at this location shows that fire is igniting and spreading at a rate that FAE Sanchez does not feel comfortable with. FAE Sanchez admits this to be true in a later interview. The video also shows a wind influencing the fire spread from west to east. The fuels between where they are firing at 930 Orchard Lane and where Engine 6162 is at 920 Orchard Lane, consist of 15-foot tall brush and oak with grass underneath [114]. FC Childe and FAE Sanchez are observed by S/T Leader Watkins as they drive back down the driveway. [64]

Jay Bertek, the supervisor for the El Cariso Hotshots observes a line of fire on the ridge between 930 and 920 Orchard Lane. He is unsure of where this fire is coming from but knows it is not the main fire. He calls his crew who are working near 902 Orchard Lane and asks them if they are firing-out. They tell him that they are not. Bertek observes that the main fire is now “leading sparks.” [56]

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez drive down the driveway of 930 Orchard Lane, which comes out directly next to the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane. The two drive up the driveway to 920 Orchard Lane where they park near the garage. The two get out and FAE Sanchez begins to light fire back towards the north, in the direction of 902 Orchard Lane. [67]

Captain McDonald walks north on the driveway from the location of Engine 6162. While near the front door of the residence, he observes a CDF pickup truck arrive at the top of the driveway and park near the garage. He observes two people get out and one of them starts lighting a fire back to the north towards 902 Orchard Lane. He does not speak with them, however he believes the Captain in the truck sees him. He does not see the truck leave. [67]

Captain McDonald indicates to the members of the crew that there is a CDF firefighter firing-out in the direction of the garage. Captain McDonald instructs the crew to fire-out the grass below the driveway. Engineer Kreps walks north on the driveway to the garage area, and observes fire on the ground already behind the garage and to the north in the brush. He then begins his strip-firing from that location to the south along the edge of the driveway. Captain McDonald throws fusees down the slope into the heavy brush below the area strip-burned. This results in a partial burn. [68]

S/T Leader Watkins and his assistant drive back down the driveway of 930 Orchard Lane and along with the S/T Leader for 1286A, park near the bottom of the driveways of 930 and 920 Orchard Lane. [64]

FAE Sanchez continues to light fire from the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane towards the driveway at 902 Orchard Lane. Alone, FC Childe in the utility returns to the bottom of the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane.64 Both FC Childe and FAE Sanchez deny having been up this driveway or having fired-out in this area.

The crew superintendent for the El Cariso Hot Shots observes fire along the ridge between 902 Orchard Lane and 920 Orchard Lane. He again calls his crew and asks if they are firing-out. The crew has arrived behind 902 Orchard Lane and is starting to contain the fire’s edge along with the bulldozer. They reply to Bertek that they are not firing-out. The crew superintendent for El Cariso, concerned about this unexplained fire on the ridge and spot fires in the meadow to the east of Orchard Lane, calls his crew out and orders them back to their safety area. [56]


Picture taken by Engineer Kreps of the fire he finds on the ground north of the garage just before he begins to fire-out from this location. This is the same area where Capt. McDonald sees two CDF personnel firing-out at the top of the driveway. View is to the north towards 902 Orchard Road.

S/T Leader Watkins and his assistant observe FC Childe in Utility 3334 come out the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane alone. FC Childe approaches them and “adamantly demands(ed) to know why we (do) not have a unit up there. We inform(ed) him we (do) and proceed(ed) to that location.” [64]

Watkins and his assistant arrive at the location of Engine 6162 at about 12:35 p.m. and review their progress and plans. Watkins observes that the sky is clear overhead and the winds are moderate, still up-canyon and upslope. S/T Leader Watkins writes in his ICS-214 that they spoke with the Captain and Engineer of Engine 6162 and discussed their situation. Watkins notes that the crew of Engine 6162 is in the process of strip-burning and about to throw fusees into the brush. He observes the fire backing down the ridge from the north and it is about 300 yards to the right of the house. S/T Leader Watkins sees nothing below the house. [69]


Area below and to the southwest of Engine 6162 where brush had been cleared and the crew of Engine 6162 strip-burned grass stubble. Capt. McDonald had thrown fusees into brush below the clearing.

As Watkins and his assistant leave 920 Orchard Lane, they receive a radio message from Engine 334 at 902 Orchard Lane. Engine 334 tells them that they have spotting from a firing operation below them which has cut off their egress. Watkins then heads to that location but is cut off by an LA County bulldozer working the area. [70] About five to eight minutes after S/T Leader Watkins leaves the scene, the crew of Engine 6162 observes an increase in the fire activity below them. [71]

S/T Leader Watkins sees signs of the fire picking up but still believes it to be from the northwest, the direction he has always thought it would come from. [72] It is at about this time that he begins to hear the fire.

FC Childe picks up FAE Sanchez and they then drive south on Orchard Lane towards 1038 Orchard. FC Childe and FAE Sanchez, arrive at 1038 Orchard Lane followed by a news 50,114 They observe firefighters sitting in chairs and FC Childe tells them to get out of the chairs. [73]

According to members of Engine 24, Captain Childe gets out of the truck and tells the firefighters in the chairs to “Get out of the fuckin’ chairs before I break you guys’ heads.” Captain Childe then advises their Captain that he is going to fire-out. FAE Sanchez starts to fire-out in a semi-circular area that begins near the driveway, proceeds to the rear of the house and then swings back towards Orchard Lane. [76]

FAE Sanchez can hear the fire picking up from the west and hears the sounds of a sustained rapid fire run. FC Childe says that the firing-out at 1038 Orchard Lane takes place about 2-3 minutes before the main fire hits that location.74 FAE Sanchez, concerned about the situation tells FC Childe that he is going to stay and help the crew. [75] [114]

The crew of Engine 24 reports that prior to this action there is little or no wind in the area. The crew observes fire from the firing operation spread to the brush and ignite an outbuilding. The fire intensifies, crosses over the driveway and cuts off the Engine crew’s egress. The crew becomes encircled by fire and the wind changes directions and becomes erratic. [77] (This occurs about 1:00 p.m. according to Childe. [113]

Burn indicators, observations from Ron Mitchell the resident at 1126 Orchard Lane, and news video footage, indicate that at about this time the flank of the main fire begins a run from the bottom of the drainage to the northeast. [116] Burning upslope and up-canyon influenced by a combination of up-canyon and westerly winds, the fire forms a major front which burns in continuous fuels directly towards the area of 920 and 930 Orchard Lane. [80]

Ron Mitchell notices a sudden wind shift with winds beginning to blow hard from the west. “And then all (of) the sudden there (is) this huge, the wind (is) fierce and there (is) this huge wall of flame that (comes) through, between my property and Hubble’s property.” (930 Orchard Lane) [80] He observes smoke cover the area north of his house and he sees flames getting big to the north of his house. Within a short time, the flames are near his house and he decides to evacuate. By the time he makes it down to Orchard Lane, he notices the time is 1:15 p.m. and the fire has burned past his house down to Orchard Lane along his driveway. [80]

During this same time period, the operator of the Los Angeles County bulldozer, Jeff Vidrinskas is notified by his transport driver, Michael Rodan (who is located near Highway 78/79 and Orchard Lane) that the fire is becoming very active. Vidrinskas takes his bulldozer down off the west side of the driveway at 902 Orchard Lane in a flanking action. Within a few minutes and less than 100 feet down the hill from the driveway, Vadrinskas pushes over an oak tree. As he does this he observes a wall of fire ahead of him. He describes it as a wall of flame well over 100 feet tall and over 300 yards wide. Looking to his left and right, all that Vadrinskas can see is the wall of fire. He pulls back to the driveway at 902 Orchard Lane. [108]


Main fire running from southwest to northeast. Viewed from Orchard Lane near 1038 Orchard. Flames on the right in background are near 930 Orchard Lane.


Fire picking up below the crew of Engine 6162 just as they begin to retreat back to the engine from firing-out. Photo taken by Engineer Kreps.

The crew of Engine 6162 gathers at the engine to talk. As the fire intensity increases, the crew decides to retreat to the passenger side of the engine away from the radiant heat below them. Firefighter-Paramedic Smith staffs a one and one-half inch hose line at the front passenger side while Engineer Rucker staffs a similar hose line near the rear passenger side. Engineer Kreps is standing at the rear duals on the passenger side with his back to the engine.

Captain McDonald is just to the rear of Firefighter-Paramedic Smith. [110] Firefighter-Paramedic Smith observes Captain McDonald closer to the rear bumper than Engineer Rucker. [111] Engineer Kreps states that all four members of the crew make it around to the passenger side of the engine. Kreps says that they move around, including walking to the tailboard of the engine (See photo taken by Engineer Kreps). Kreps recalls Firefighter-Paramedic Smith being forward of his position (towards the front bumper). Kreps has his back to the engine rear duals, and Engineer Rucker is directly in front of him no more than five feet away. [112] Captain McDonald has the only portable radio. [81]

As Firefighter-Paramedic Smith takes his position at the front of the engine, he notices hot embers blowing into the juniper bushes on the patio behind him. He uses his hose to knock down some fire in the bushes. [85]


Picture taken by Engineer Kreps as he steps out from behind the cover of the passenger side of the engine.

Captain McDonald states about this time, “The sky start(s) turning orange, and it just (got) – at that point in time – became pretty untenable outside. So, I order(ed) the crew to deploy inside the structure.” [82] Firefighter-Paramedic Smith describes the conditions as, “Uh, full sunlight to the point where we went around the engine, to that twilight, darkness and smoke and the orange glow and fire embers going constant past the engine, the heat, the heat intensity dramatically start(ed) to pick up.” [83]

Engineer Kreps states, “that’s when the sky got dark, it started getting real hot, embers flying everywhere, and it just, the sound of the, you know, the freight train coming, it was getting worse and worse and worse and we decide that before it got any worse, we better retreat to the house.” [84]

Members of the crew notice a significant wind increase at this time. A flaming front is observed by Firefighter-Paramedic Smith blowing across the driveway in the direction of the garage, cutting off their egress. [86] Captain McDonald orders the crew to move to the shelter of the residence. [82] At about the same time, S/T Leader Watkins, positioned near 915 Orchard Lane, sees fire “blowing through” the area of the ridge north of Engine 6162 and south of 902 Orchard Lane. He estimates this event to last about 15 seconds. Visibility is down to a few feet due to heavy smoke and S/T Leader Watkins later states “you could hear the fire at that point. It was, it was comin’ and it was rippin’.” [87]

Juniper and Boxwood bushes planted along the cement patio behind the crew of Engine 6162 burst into flame. Responding to Captain McDonald’s order to get into the structure, Firefighter-Paramedic Smith immediately drops his hose line and runs in the direction of the three-foot high raised patio. (During the accident scene investigation, a nozzle and hose remains were located on the ground just forward of the front bumper on the passenger side, consistent with Smith’s statement.) Immediately upon leaving the protection of the engine, Firefighter-Paramedic Smith experiences severe thermal conditions. He leaps past the burning bushes and onto the patio. He is followed closely by Engineer Kreps who runs to the steps, stumbles and falls to his knees at the top of the steps, recovers and continues to retreat behind the rear of the house following Firefighter-Paramedic Smith. It is a distance of about 170 feet to the rear door. [88]

Captain McDonald, moves towards the steps of the patio and accounts for Engineer Kreps and Firefighter-Paramedic Smith while they make it up onto the patio and around the rear corner of the house. He then turns back towards the rear of the engine to account for Engineer Rucker. He does not understand why Engineer Rucker is taking so long. Near the rear of the engine Captain McDonald locates Engineer Rucker, who appears to him to be dazed and confused. [89]


Steps which the crew members used to get up onto the patio.

Captain McDonald starts yelling at Engineer Rucker to move to the house. “Now, Steve, looked back and Steve’s at the back of the Type 3 and, I said, Steve, c’mon let’s go. We gotta deploy. And he’s still on the, I just don’t know at this point in time exactly. I mean, I could see what the other guys, had a mission and purpose to get inside the structure. Steve, he didn’t seem to have mission and purpose. He was just kind of, he started, so as I talked to him he, he turned his head and almost started walking the opposite way and I said, Steve, c’mon, let’s go. We gotta get in there. We have to, and he goes, uh, and he started coming towards me, he said, ‘Oh, I’m burning up.” [89]

Captain McDonald observes Engineer Rucker take two steps toward him and fall to the ground. Captain McDonald sees him “(get) up on all fours” and stand back up. Engineer Rucker then turns toward the tailboard of the engine and McDonald thinks he takes a “half step” in that direction. He notes that Engineer Rucker is looking in a southeast direction. [110]

Engineer Rucker turns towards McDonald and states “I’m burning.” McDonald sees Engineer Rucker step towards him and then turn towards the bushes and the patio. Rucker then falls face-forward into the burning bushes. Captain McDonald moves towards Engineer Rucker who is already pushing himself away from the bushes. McDonald assists Engineer Rucker to the steps and Engineer Rucker makes it up the steps under his own power. McDonald notes that Engineer Rucker is slightly hunched over at the waist. [89] , [110] He then follows Engineer Rucker up the steps to the patio. [89]

Physical evidence located at the top of the steps, including a gated-wye, fusees, hose spanner, and flagging from pouches attached to the web gear of Captain McDonald, indicate that Captain McDonald’s web gear was failing at this time and equipment was falling off. This was most likely due to burning of the web gear and pouch.

No member of the crew has any recollection of Engineer Rucker having a wildland hose pack on, and Captain McDonald has no recollection of instructing Engineer Rucker to don a hose pack at this time. However, physical evidence recovered from and around the body of Engineer Rucker clearly indicates that he had a 200 foot, one and one-half inch wildland Gnass hose pack on his back. These packs are located in the middle rear compartment of Engine 6162. An inventory of the engine after the accident shows that one 200-foot wildland hose pack is missing from this compartment.


Burnt outline of first 100 feet hose pack dropped near the feet of Engineer Rucker on patio. In-line Tee visible in upper middle portion of photo.

Physical evidence at the scene shows that as Captain McDonald and Engineer Rucker crossed the patio, the first 100 feet of the hose pack fell to the ground and burned without having been deployed fully. It cannot be determined if this was due to an intentional deployment or failure of the hose pack.

Captain McDonald observes Engineer Rucker fall to the ground on the patio (within a few feet of the first 100-foot bundle of hose). Captain McDonald makes an attempt to get Engineer Rucker up but cannot. [89]

A King portable radio belonging to the Novato Fire District is later found on the ground next to the body of Engineer Rucker on the side nearest the steps. This radio had been carried by Captain McDonald and was being used to transmit on the tactical channel. Captain McDonald has no recollection of making a radio transmission next to Engineer Rucker at this point in time.


King portable radio left on patio just to the west side of Engineer Rucker (between Rucker and patio steps)

S/T Leader Watkins, from his position near 915 Orchard Lane observes the fire front hit the entire area and roll over the ridgetop down towards Orchard Lane, from 902 Orchard Lane down to 1038 Orchard Lane where Engine 71 is located. The conditions go from hazy to dark to hazy again within just a couple of minutes. His assistant gets on the radio and begins to do radio checks with the units. It is at this time that they hear a radio call on the tactical channel from Engine 6162 that they have a man down. [90] Documented times for this transmission from other units who heard the call on the tactical channel range from 12:45 p.m. [91] to 12:55 p.m. [92] Water tender operator Marchisio writes in his ICS-214, “1245, Heard radio transmission over tactical net reporting- Firefighter down, followed by –Not able to get in his shelter.” [91]

Captain McDonald states that he “turned like 180 degrees trying to yank him (Engineer Rucker) up.” [89] This is consistent with the physical evidence found at the scene indicating that the second 100-foot bundle of hose from the hose pack had been pulled away from Engineer Rucker in the 180-degree direction described by Captain McDonald, towards the rear of the patio.


Second 100 feet of hose pack found just above and next to the right shoulder of Engineer Rucker.

Captain McDonald yells for the other two crew members to return but cannot be heard due to the noise of the fire. McDonald is aware that, “at (this) point in time, I’m fryin’ and I know that I’m getting badly burned…” [89]

The fire has reached the ridgeline and is being funneled across the ridge to the east. Physical evidence recovered at the accident scene indicates that fire impinging upon the charged hose lines coming off the rear of the engine causes the hose to fail and the engine tank is pumped almost dry.

Captain McDonald, feels himself getting burned, and walks around the rear corner of the house. He then returns around the corner onto the patio to make another attempt at getting Engineer Rucker up. He observes that Engineer Rucker’s body is on fire and determines that he is beyond help and turns back toward the rear of the residence. [89]

Having arrived at the rear door, Firefighter-Paramedic Smith and Engineer Kreps use the pre-positioned axe and kicking to force the door open. The two of them enter into the rear of the residence. Turning around, they realize that there is no one else following them. They decide to return and look for Captain McDonald and Engineer Rucker. [92]


View from near the rear door of the residence looking toward the patio. This is the path taken by the crew after turning the corner from the patio, and the route used to return to look for missing crew members. Tree located in upper right corner of photo is next to the location where Engineer Rucker went down for the third and final time.

Firefighter-Paramedic Smith and Engineer Kreps travel back along the rear of the house to the south end, using the house as protection. As they near the southeast corner of the house, near the patio, they observe that beyond the end of the house there are solid flames blowing sideways, including the area of the patio. Just as they arrive at the corner, Captain McDonald staggers around the corner out of the flames. He appears to be burned and dazed. [92]

Captain McDonald tells the other two that Engineer Rucker has fallen and tells them they need to go back for him. Captain McDonald turns to go back after the fallen Engineer. Engineer Kreps and Firefighter-Paramedic Smith determine the patio area is not tenable. They see direct flame and feel an extreme amount of heat in the patio area. Taking the Captain with them, the three retreat back into the rear door of the residence. [92]

Inside the residence, feeling himself burning, Captain McDonald takes off his web gear. He searches for his King portable radio but cannot find it to make a call out for help. The three discuss a plan to search for Engineer Rucker. [93]

After a moment, a decision is made to open the front door slowly and check to see if the area in front of the house is tenable. When the door is opened, intense heat surges through the small opening. The door is quickly closed. After another few minutes, a decision is made to check the front door again. This time the heat has subsided and Engineer Kreps exits the doorway in search of the missing Engineer. Firefighter-Paramedic Smith attempts to exit the door but is forced back by a wave of heat. He remains inside the residence and cares for the Captain. [95]

Engineer Kreps moves towards the front bumper line of the engine taking small shallow breaths. He passes the front of the patio and observes the body of Engineer Rucker midway across the patio. Kreps continues to the bumper line and advances it towards the body. Opening the nozzle, he gets a 10 to 15 second burst of water before the engine’s tank is dry. [95]

At this time, an increase in fire intensity forces Engineer Kreps to take shelter in the rear seats of the engine. Once inside, Kreps considers deploying the extra fire shelters stored in the cab. Concerned that Firefighter-Paramedic Smith and Captain McDonald may think another member of the crew is down and come searching for him, Engineer Kreps takes a single breath and runs to the front door. Firefighter-Paramedic Smith, in the house, begins to open the door in an effort to go after Engineer Kreps. As Firefighter-Paramedic Smith opens the door to look for him, Engineer Kreps steps inside and rejoins the other two. [95]

While the three of them sit near the front entrance of the house, the north end of the structure begins to burn. Smoke begins banking down to waist level and a decision is made by the group to try and get to the engine. The three exit the front door. The Captain is assisted to the front passenger seat. Firefighter-Paramedic Smith runs to the rear of the engine and disconnects the two protection lines. He then enters the cab at the rear passenger seat. Engineer Kreps gets into the driver’s seat. [96]

Engineer Kreps engages the drive for the engine and slowly drives towards the north and turns down the driveway to the east. Heavy, dark smoke obscures the driveway. Engineer Kreps is forced to feel his way down the driveway using the feel of the tires dropping off the edge of the pavement to make corrections. At one location, the engine is stopped to avoid running off the road and getting hung up on a tree. After a short pause, concern about being overrun by the fire again convinces them that they need to move forward. [96]


Photo taken after the accident with Engine 6162 placed back into position of where it was during the burn-over. The Engine is facing north. Fired-out area shown in lower left corner of photo. Steps used to access patio are just north of the engine. Engineer Rucker’s body was found just below tree on patio.

At 1:05 p.m., during the descent of the driveway, the Captain gets on the radio and transmits a firefighter down message on Command Net.97 S/T Leader Watkins, hearing that the crew is leaving one person behind, gets onto Command Net and calls for air drops and a medivac. 98,115 S/T Leader Watkins and Division I exchange radio traffic on the situation and discuss the possibility of a rescue attempt for the downed Engineer. [98]

Engine 6162 is successfully driven to the bottom of the driveway and onto Orchard Lane. S/T Leader Watkins, only 25 to 30 feet from the end of the driveway and in heavy smoke, does not see the engine leave. [98] Engine 6162 travels down Orchard Lane to the south. At 1:09 p.m., [97] Captain McDonald again makes a radio transmission on Command Net to other units concerning the incident. Captain McDonald orders the engine to stop in the road and he gets out. The crew members assist him back into the engine. They continue towards Highway 78/79. At 1:10 p.m., the three crew members of Engine 6162 arrive at the south end of Orchard Lane just short of Highway 78/79 where they found the Plumas Hotshots. [99] The three crew members of Engine 6162 exit the engine and announce to the Plumas Hotshot crew that they have been burned.

S/T Leader Watkins and his assistant position their command vehicle at the bottom of the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane in an attempt to evaluate the potential of going to the aid of the downed Engineer. Conditions preclude a safe effort to go up the driveway and they stay near the bottom. [100]

About this time, CDF Copter 202 with FC Scofield, returns to the area and observes that the ridge where they have been working previously is smoked-in and the winds are out of the northwest. Shortly after that, he hears Branch III on Air-to-Ground net ask the Air Tactical Group Supervisor for agency ships in the area to conduct a medivac. [59]

USFS Engine 39 arrives at about 1:11 p.m. [57] at the medical treatment area and volunteers to conduct a search and rescue operation at 920 Orchard Lane. They drive through heavy smoke conditions on Orchard Lane and meet with S/T Leader Watkins at the bottom of the driveway of 920 Orchard Lane. Engine 39 gets the layout from the strike team leader and then the five-person engine crew drives to the scene. [101]

Engine 39 arrives at the scene at about 1:15 p.m. and after discovering the body of Engineer Rucker, announces an “11-44” at 1:18 p.m. [102] S/T Leader Watkins states that within a minute or two of this broadcast, he hears a loud release of pressure which he thinks is a propane tank release. Watkins then hears Engine 39 make a radio transmission stating that they have a propane tank venting with flames. All equipment is ordered out of the area. [103]

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez are finishing their independent firing-out operation around the last house on the south end of Orchard Lane at this time. Near the last house, FC Childe stops and does a 15 to 20-second interview with the news media. At no time does FC Childe hear any traffic about anyone being overrun by fire or being hurt. FC Childe sees the entire strike team of engines pulling out and does not know why. He then conducts a recon to make sure all the engines are out. [104]

FC Childe admits that at no time during the entire operation does he attempt to contact the Division Supervisor and advise him of his intended actions. Childe does not see the Division Supervisor during his activities on Orchard Lane that day. FC Childe states that “I didn’t even give it a thought to call the Division because I didn’t really have a lot of time to try.” [105]

FC Childe and FAE Sanchez drive to the south end of Orchard Lane. It is not until they arrive near Highway 78/79 that they discover that someone has been burned. FC Childe sees the Novato Engine (6162) for the first time. [106]

FC Childe later states that he hoped the Novato Engine had been located some place north of where the main fire made its run. [106]


Engine 6162 at initial medical treatment area at 3:08 p.m. on Oct. 29, 2003. Note the time stamp on the photograph is one hour ahead of the correct time.

Post Accident Treatment

The Plumas Hotshots are staged at Hwy 78/79 and Orchard Lane at approximately 1:00 p.m. They hear radio traffic about an engine burn-over and firefighter injuries.

At approximately 1:03 p.m., the Julian Fire Department Paramedic Ambulance is notified by radio that San Diego County Sheriff Deputies are transporting a patient of a vehicle accident to the Julian Fire Station, #71. The patient is reported to have been rear ended while in a black sports utility vehicle on Hwy 78/79 near Farmer Lane. This accident takes place just east of where Highway 78/79 crosses the San Diego River. The medics do not see the vehicle accident scene. (This incident causes initial confusion as to the location of the burn-over.)

The Sheriff Deputies bring the patient of the vehicle accident to the Julian Fire Station at about 1:08 p.m. Julian Fire Paramedic Chris Yeary initially treats this patient. While packaging the vehicle accident patient, Paramedic Yeary is told about firefighters being burned. Paramedic Yeary requests that the backup Julian Fire Department Ambulance respond to this location to treat the victim of the vehicle accident.

The vehicle accident patient was reported to be an out-of-state volunteer firefighter who was assisting in the fire fighting efforts. Mercy Air Flight transported the victim to the hospital.

At about 1:10 p.m., Engine 6162 arrives at the intersection of Orchard Lane and Highway 78/79. They advise the Plumas Hotshots there that they are the engine crew that was burned-over. The Plumas Hotshots triage the patients and administer medical assistance to the injured firefighters. Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulances and medical helicopters are requested.

Captain McDonald is triaged as the most severely injured with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree burns. Captain McDonald is in need of immediate ALS intervention. Prior to being treated for their own burns, Engineer (Paramedic) Kreps and Firefighter-Paramedic Smith from Engine 6162 use the ALS equipment from their engine to start two IVs on Captain McDonald.

Engineer Kreps tells Cedar Incident Safety Officer John Simon that Engineer Rucker is an “1144” at the burn-over scene. Engineer Kreps states that Engineer Rucker was fully involved in fire when he last saw him.

At approximately 1:27 p.m., the first Julian Paramedic Ambulance with Paramedic Yeary arrives at Engine 6162’s location. Captain McDonald is packaged and transported to a landing zone. CDF Copter 202 transports Captain McDonald and Paramedic Valentini to Ramona Airport to rendezvous with a Mercy Air Helicopter at about 1:52 p.m. Captain McDonald is transferred to the Mercy Air Crew and transported to the University of San Diego Burn Center.

CDF Copter 406 transports Engineer Kreps and Firefighter-Paramedic Smith to Ramona Airport at 1:56 p.m. to rendezvous with a Mercy Air Helicopter. Paramedic Yeary treats Kreps and during the flight. At Ramona, Kreps and Smith are transferred to the Mercy Air Crew for transport to the University of San Diego Burn Center.

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References

1. Written statement by John Michelini dated 11-02-03. See tab section 20 of Attachments.

2. Typed statement by Thomas Keating fax date of 11-03-03. See tab section 21 of Attachments.

3. Interview and written statement by Jim Watkins dated October 30-31, 2003. See tab section 24 of Attachments.

4. ICS 214 by Ray Chaney for operational period of October 29, 2003. See Tab section 17 of Attachments.

5. Typed statement by Ray Sauceda. See tab section 56 of Attachments.

6. E-mail from Roger Raines on documenting telephone interview with Michelini and Chandler on November 25, 2003. See tab section 22 of Attachments.

7. Tape-recorded interview with Dan Runnestrand on November 2, 2003. See tab section 23 of Attachments.

8. ICS 214 by Jim Watkins for operational period of 10/29/03. See tab section 24 of Attachments.

9. Tape recorded interview and written statement by Jim Watkins. See tab section 24 of Attachments.

10. Tape recorded interview with John Childe on October 31, 2003. See tab section 50, page eight and 46 of Attachments.

11. Tape recorded interview with John Childe on October 31, 2003. See tab section 50, page 12 of Attachments.

12. Tape recorded telephone interview with Mike Wakoski. See tab section 18 of Attachments.

13. Tape recorded interview with John Childe on October 31, 2003. See tab section 50, page 46 of Attachments.

14. Tape recorded interview with Jim Watkins on October 31, 2003 See tab section 24, page 29 of Attachments.

15. Tape recorded interview with Dan Runnestrand on November 2, 2003. See tab section 23, page 15 of Attachments.

16. Tape recorded interview with Smith on October 30, 2003. See tab section 27, page 12 of Attachments.

17. Tape recorded interview with Shawn Kreps on October 30, 2003. See tab section 28, page 11 of Attachments.

18. Written statement by Captain Michael Carpenter, Vallejo Fire Dept. dated 10/30/03. See tab section 36, page one and two.

19. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24 of Attachments page 19.

20. Tape-recorded interview with Dan Runnestrand in tab section 23 of Attachments page nine. Also mentioned on ICS 214 of Mike Wakoski in tab section 18 of Attachments.

21. Tape-recorded interview with Hunter Ridenour. See tab section 57 of Attachments.

22. Tape-recorded interview with Ron Mitchell. See tab section 44 page three and four of Attachments.

23. ICS 214 for Oct. 29, 2003, by Capt. Carpenter showing arrival at assignment at 1068 Orchard Lane at 11:57 a.m. See tab section 36 of Attachments.

24. Tape-recorder interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 24 in Attachments.

25. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 26 in Attachments.

26. Tape-recorded interview with FC John Childe. See tab section 50, page 14 of the Attachments.

27. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 37 of the Attachments.

28. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 28 of the Attachments.

29. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 27 of the Attachments.

30. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, page 20 and tab section 28, page 13-14 of the Attachments.

31. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith, Engineer Kreps, Capt. McDonald, and S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 27, pages 20-21; tab section 28 page 14-15; section 26, page 19 of the Attachments.

32. See S/T Leader Watkins statements and crew statements in tab sections 24, 36,37, 38, 39 of the Attachments.

33. Tape-recorded interview with FC John Childe. See tab section 50, page 16 of the Attachments.

34. Tape-recorded interview with FC John Childe. See tab section 50, page 51 of the Attachments.

35. Tape-recorded interview with FC John Childe. See tab section 50, page 16 of the Attachments.

36. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 29 of the Attachments.

37. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 20 of the Attachments.

38. ICS-214 for 10-29-03, FC John Childe. See tab section 50, ICS-214.

39. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe and ICS 214. See tab section 50, page 32, of Attachments and tab section 50, ICS-214 for 10-29-03 by FC Childe.

40. Tape-recorded interview with FAE Sanchez. See tab section 51, page 12 of Attachments.

41. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 44 of Attachments.

42. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, pages 21 and 38 of Attachments.

43. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 53 of Attachments.

44. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 19 of Attachments.

45. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 51 of Attachments.

46. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 26 of Attachments.

47. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 27 of Attachments.

48. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, pages 29-30 of Attachments.

49. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 37 of Attachments.

50. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 38 of Attachments.

51. Typed statement by Capt. Carpenter of engine 24. See tab section 36 of Attachments.

52. Tape-recorded interviews with Capt. McDonald. See tab section 25, page three of Attachments.

53. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, page 21 and tab section 28, page 15 of Attachments.

54. Tape-recorded interview with FF Smith. See tab section 27, pages 25-26 of Attachments.

55. Tape-recorded interview with FF Smith. See tab section 27, pages 21-22 of Attachments.

56. Tape-recorded interview with El Cariso Hot Shot Superintendent Jay Bertek. See tab section 52, pages 11-12 of Attachments.

57. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith, Capt. McDonald and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 26, page. five; tab section 27 pages 29-30; tab section 28, page. 18 of Attachments.

58. Tape-recorded interview with FAE Sanchez. See tab section 51, page. 11-12 of Attachments.

59. Written statement by Capt. Scofield on Copter 202, dated 11-02-03. See tab section 59 of Attachments.

60. Tape-recorded interview with FAE Sanchez. See tab section 51, pages 14-15 of Attachments.

61. Supplementary Investigation Report 0-4/c. See tab section 51, Supp. report by Alan Carlson.

62. Supplementary Investigation Report 0-4/d. See tab section 50, Supp. report by Alan Carlson.

63. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, pages 30-31; tab section 28, pages 17-18 in Attachments.

64. Typed statement by Asst. S/T Leader McLaughlin. See tab section 25, page four of Attachments.

65. Tape-recorded interview with FAE Sanchez. See tab section 51, pages 17-20 of Attachments.

66. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 65 of Attachments.

67. Tape-recorded interview with Capt. McDonald. See tab section 26, pages four, 14 and 15 of Attachments.

68. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith, Engineer Kreps, and Capt. McDonald. See tab section 27, pages 33; tab section 28, pages 21-23, 42 of Attachments.

69. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins and his ICS-214 for 10-29-03. See tab section 24, page 48 and ICS-214 last page, in attachment.

70. ICS-214 by S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, last page of ICS-214 in attachment.

71. Tape-recorded interviews with Capt. McDonald, FF Smith, Engineer Kreps, and S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 26, page 31; tab section 27, Pages 35-36; tab section 28, page 41; tab section 24 ICS-214 for S/T Leader Watkins.

72. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 49 of Attachments.

73. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, pages 40 and 23 of the Attachments.

74. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 23 of Attachments.

75. Tape-recorded interview with FAE Sanchez. See tab section 51, page 24 of Attachments.

76. Written supplemental report by Kevin Johnston with the crew of engine. See tab section 36, supplemental interview first page, Attachments.

77. Typed statement of Capt. Carpenter. See tab section 36 of Attachments.

78. (Expansion space holder)

79. (Expansion space holder)

80. Tape-recorded interview with Ron Mitchell. See tab section 44, page five of Attachments.

81. Tape-recorded interviews with Capt. McDonald, FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 26, pages 21-22; tab section 27, pages 38-39; tab section 28, pages 26-27 of Attachments.

82. Tape-recorded interview of Capt. McDonald. See tab section 26, page 6 of Attachments.

83. Tape-recorded interview of FF Smith. See tab section 27, page 38 of Attachments.

84. Tape-recorded interview of Engineer Kreps. See tab section 28, page 26 of Attachments.

85. Tape-recorded interview with FF Smith. See tab section 27, page 39 of Attachments.

86. Tape-recorded interview with FF Smith. See tab section 27, pages 39-40 of Attachments.

87. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, pages 53-54 of Attachments.

88. Tape-recorded interview with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, pages 41-42; tab section 28, page 27 of Attachments.

89. Tape-recorded interview with Capt. McDonald. See tab section 26, pages six through eight of Attachments.

90. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, pages 55-56 of Attachments.

91. ICS-214 from C. Marchisio, see tab section 90 of Attachments. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 56 of Attachments section. Written statement by Ryan Bauer. See tab section 86, page one of Attachments.

92. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, pages 42-44, 46 and tab section 28, pages 27-28 of Attachments.

93. Tape-recorded interview with Capt. McDonald. See tab section 26, page 27 of first interview and McDonald second interview in tab section 26.

94. Second tape-recorded interview with Capt. McDonald. See tab section 26.

95. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, pages 47-48 and tab section 28 pages 28-30 of Attachments.

96. Tape-recorded interviews with FF Smith and Engineer Kreps. See tab section 27, pages 48-50 and tab section 28, pages 31-32 of Attachments.

97. General Message form by Mike Brown. Time stamped on PDA. See tab section 75 of Attachments. Also on ICS-214 by Mike Brown.

98. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 58 of Attachments.

99. Written statement by Plumas Hot Shot FF. Ryan Bauer. See tab section 86, of Attachments.

100. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 59 of the Attachments.

101. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 60 of attachment. Tape-recorded interview with Brian Rhodes. See tab section 64, pages 8-9 of Attachments.

102. Typed statement by Fire Fighter Ryan Stewart, USFS Engine 39. See tab section 66, page two of Attachments.

103. Tape-recorded interview with S/T Leader Watkins. See tab section 24, page 62 of Attachments.

104. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, pages 28, 29 and 44 of the Attachments.

105. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, pages 42 and 43 of the Attachments.

106. Tape-recorded interview with FC Childe. See tab section 50, page 30 of the attachment.

107. Tape-recorded interview with Dozer Operator Jeff Vidrinskas. See tab section 54, page seven of the Attachments.

108. Tape-recorded interview with Jeff Vidrinskas. See tab section 54, pages 11-16 of the Attachments.

109. Refer to IAPs for the Cedar Incident, October 28th and 29th, 2003. See tab sections 202, 204, 205.

110. Supplemental interview with Captain McDonald dated Jan. 20, 2004. See tab section 26 of Attachments.

111. Tape-recorded interview with Fire Fighter Smith. See tab section 27, page 57 of Attachments.

112. Tape-recorded interview with Engineer Kreps. See tab section 28, pages 26-27 and 3637 of Attachments.

113. ICS-214 from John Childe. See tab section 50

114. Video from John Childe. Evidence item 16P. Also see compilation copy of videos.

115. News station videos. Evidence items 17P, 18P, and 19P. Also see compilation copy of videos

116. Fire Behavior Report and FARSITE Executive Summary. See tab sections 252, 253.

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