Point Fire, 1995
&
Island Fork Fire, 1999
dedication
Point Fire Case Study
Point Fire Accident Investigation
A. Point Fire Overview
B. Investigation
C. Recommendations
D. Supporting Data
- Sequence of Events
- Organization Charts
- Site Investigation
- Fire Behavior Report
- Property Damage Report
- Witness Statements
- Outline of Kuna Wildland Training Provided by BLM
E. Records and Reports
- Preplanned Dispatch
- BLM Radio Transmission Log
- Ada County Dispatch Log
- Fire Incident Status Summary
- Escaped Fire Situation Analysis
- Wildland Fire Entrapment Report
- Technical Analysis of Personal Protective Equipment
- Vehicle Inspection
- Weather Reports
F. Glossary
——————
Island Fork Fire Accident Investigation
——————
Point Fire — U.S. District Court Civil Case
Ruling on I.C.'s Decisions - Nov. 10, 1998
• Factual Background
• Legal Analysis
Ruling on BLM Liability - Feb. 19, 1999
• Findings
of Fact
• Legal Standards
• Analysis
Ruling on Public Safety Officer Benefits
(PSOB)
——————
——————
Colorado Firecamp extends special thanks to Linda Perkins, BLM
Idaho State FOIA Coordinator, for her friendly assistance in gathering
the Point Fire documents. BLM FOIA Letter
|
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DEANNA C. BUTTRAM, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Civil Case No. 96-0324-S-BLW
(Consolidated with)
Civil Case No. 96-0452-S-BLW
Civil Case No. 97-0129-S-BLW
Introduction
William Buttram and Joshua Oliver lost their lives fighting a wildfire
known as the Point Fire. Their families, the plaintiffs in this consolidated
action, claim that the agency supervising the firefighters, the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), is responsible for the deaths. The plaintiffs
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, challenging a broad range
of decisions made by the BLM. The BLM responded with a motion for partial
summary judgment, asserting that some of those decisions were immune from
challenge because they were discretionary in nature, and hence protected
by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The BLM's motion
was argued on November 6,1998, and is now at issue. The Court finds that
some of the BLM's decisions were so influenced by social, political, and
economic concern that they fall within the discretionary function exception;
the bulk of the challenged decisions, however, do not fall into that category.
Therefore the Court shall grant in part and deny in part the motion for
partial summary judgment. The Court's reasoning is set out below.
Factual Background
On July 28,1995, lightning sparked a fire in the dry grasses and sagebrush
desert land about 16 miles southwest of Boise, Idaho. The fire was burning
on BLM land, and BLM fire crews responded. The first crew to reach the
fire was headed by David Kerby who, by virtue of being the first crew
chief to reach the fire, was designated as the incident Commander, the
person with overall responsibility for fighting the fire. Other crews
soon followed. The fire became known as the Point Fire.
Kerby's decisions as Incident Commander (I.C.) would be guided by BLM
fire suppression policies that depended in part on the fire's location.
The Point Fire was burning near the Snake River Birds of Prey National
Conservation Area, a 500,000 acre sanctuary for the largest concentration
of raptors in the world. To protect the birds, the BLM had made a policy
decision years earlier to "aggressively attack and suppress all wildfires"
in this area. That policy is contained in the BLM’s Boise District
Fire Management Activity Plan (FMAP). see footnote
#1
The FMAP also played an important role in determining what resources
Kerby had to work with in fighting the fire. The FMAP includes a Lightning
Operations Plan that is triggered when lightning fires are occurring,
and was in effect during the Point Fire. That Plan describes the resources
that should be made available for different types of lightning-caused
fires, and provides a guide for rating the severity of the fire. The rating
system-known as the "Burning Index"—rates fires on a numerical
scale depicting the amount of effort needed to contain the fire given
the time of year, fuel conditions, and other factors. The Burning Index
increases as the days become hotter and the fuel conditions become more
incendiary. The higher the Burning Index number, the greater the resources
that should be made available to fight the fire. For example, a fire rated
as a Response Level I is a fire early or late in the fire season that
has a Burning Index rating from 0 to 34. For this type of fire, the FMAP
states that “the typical response would be a single unit or crew
and a detection aircraft, if available.” Another section of the
FMAP also recommends that two fire engines be dispatched along with the
detection aircraft.
The Point Fire was burning during the summer fire season, with temperatures
near the high 90s. Because of higher-than-normal spring moisture, cheatgrass
growth was especially dense and mature sagebrush added to the fuel load.
The fire was caused by dry-lightning, and the weather reports for that
day contained a fire watch warning because of the continuing threat of
thunderstorms and strong gusty winds.
Given these factors, the Fire Management Specialist with the BLM, William
Casey Jr., testified in his Declaration that the Burning Index for the
Point Fire was 31, requiring the implementation of a Response Level I.
Casey pointed out that the BLM responded with greater resources than would
be called for by the FMAP for a Level I response because the BLM initially
dispatched five engines, a bulldozer, a tender, and a detection helicopter.
David Kerby arrived at the fire at 7:00 p.m. A few minutes later, the
Kuna Rural Fire District's (RFD) Fire Chief, Richard W. Cromwell, contacted
Kerby and asked him if he needed any assistance. Kerby responded that
he could use a brush truck ( see footnote #2
) and a water tender. Immediately, the Kuna RFD dispatched two brush trucks
and a water tender. One of the brush trucks, Kuna Engine 620, had decedents
William Buttram and Joshua Oliver on board. Buttram and Oliver were inexperienced,
having only a year-and-a-half of firefighting experience between them.
The Kuna RFD engines arrived at the fire about 7:30 p.m. By this time,
Kerby had viewed the fire from a helicopter, and returned to the site
to direct the suppression efforts. He directed the Kuna RFD engines to
"bump in behind" the BLM engines working the northern perimeter
of the fire. Kerby Deposition at 66, Il. 16-17. Kerby felt at
this time that these engines would ''just basically [be doing] mop up,
putting any little flare-ups that might come out.” Id.
at 20-22.
About an hour after the Kuna RFD engines arrived and started work on
the fire, the BLM's dispatch office reported to Kerby a “red flag
warning” for dry lightning and strong winds up to 50 miles per hour.
At the time Kerby received this report, he felt that the fire was no longer
spreading as the perimeter had been wet down and the fire was continuing
to burn out in the middle. One of the two Kuna RFD engines called Kerby
on the radio at that point, notifying Kerby that they were out of water
and asking for instructions. Kerby told them to “to refill and stand
by because there were expected high winds in the area.” Kerby
Deposition at 102, Il. 10-11.
Kuna RFD Engine 622 went to refill, but it was not accompanied by Engine
620, containing Buttram and Oliver. Instead, Engine 620 drove north of
the fire on a two-track dirt road. After traveling about 1,900 feet along
this road, Engine 620 turned off the road to the east and drove cross-country,
through heavy sagebrush, first east and then north-northeast. When Engine
620 was about 2,000 feet due north of the Point Fire's northern perimeter,
it stalled in an area surrounded by unburned sagebrush and grasses. About
25 minutes had elapsed since the red flag warning.
At the same time, a thunderstorm created strong winds blowing to the
north. The winds pushed the fire at a furious rate. Within just 4 minutes,
the fire had encompassed Engine 620, killing its occupants.
<<< continue
reading—Analysis >>>
footnotes
footnote #1 The
FMAP is the result of a bottom-up process of developing fire management
plans within the BLM. These plans were developed first at the
District level and then consolidated into statewide plans that
were in turn consolidated into a BLM National Plan. The Boise
District FMAP was completed in July of 1994. It was consolidated
into the BLM'S Idaho FMAP, which was completed in January, 1995,
and approved by the BLM in March, 1996. Two other plans relevant
to the Point Fire were the BLM's Lower Snake River Ecosystem Fire
Preparedness Plan, issued in June, 1995, and the South Canyon
Fire Abatement Plan issued in May, 1995. Further guidance that
was available at the time of the Point Fire was contained in two
publications of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG):
(1) The Fireline Handbook, a "nuts and bolts" pocket
field guide for firefighting techniques; and (2) The Wildland
Fire Qualifications Subsystem, a set of standards for training.
The NWCG is a collection of federal agencies, including the BLM,
and the National Association of State Foresters.
footnote #2 A
brush truck is a four-wheel drive vehicle capable of hauling water
and spraying it onto the fire.
|
<<< continue
reading—Analysis >>>
|
