Point Fire, 1995
&
Island Fork Fire, 1999
dedication
Point Fire Case Study
Point Fire Accident Investigation
A. Point Fire Overview
B. Investigation
C. Recommendations
D. Supporting Data
- Sequence of Events
- Organization Charts
- Site Investigation
- Fire Behavior Report
- Property Damage Report
- Witness Statements
- Outline of Kuna Wildland Training Provided by BLM
E. Records and Reports
- Preplanned Dispatch
- BLM Radio Transmission Log
- Ada County Dispatch Log
- Fire Incident Status Summary
- Escaped Fire Situation Analysis
- Wildland Fire Entrapment Report
- Technical Analysis of Personal Protective Equipment
- Vehicle Inspection
- Weather Reports
F. Glossary
——————
Island Fork Fire Accident Investigation
——————
Point Fire — U.S. District Court Civil Case
Ruling on I.C.'s Decisions - Nov. 10, 1998
• Factual Background
• Legal Analysis
Ruling on BLM Liability - Feb. 19, 1999
• Findings
of Fact
• Legal Standards
• Analysis
Ruling on Public Safety Officer Benefits
(PSOB)
——————
——————
Colorado Firecamp extends special thanks to Linda Perkins, BLM
Idaho State FOIA Coordinator, for her friendly assistance in gathering
the Point Fire documents. BLM FOIA Letter
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DEANNA C. BUTTRAM, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Civil Case No. 96-0324-S-BLW
(Consolidated with)
Civil Case No. 96-0452-S-LMB
Civil Case No. 97-0129-S-BLW
Introduction
The Court has before it the Government's motion to amend judgment. In
a Judgment filed February 19, 1999,
the Court awarded plaintiffs $751,712.28 in their wrongful death suit
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Government seeks
to reduce that judgment by the sums plaintiffs received under the Public
Safety Officers Death Benefits Act (PSODBA). The Court will deny the motion,
and explains its reasoning below.
Analysis
When a fireman dies in the line of duty, the Government pays his survivors
a death benefit under PSODBA, 42 U.S.C. § 3796. In this case, each
of the four plaintiffs—Deanna and Jeremiah Buttram, Darla Reber,
and Michael Oliver—received $65,208 pursuant to PSODBA.
The Government cannot be forced to pay twice for the same injury. See
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (holding that
FTCA judgment must be reduced by the amount of veteran's benefits received).
If the FTCA award and the PSODBA payments compensated the Buttrams for
the same elements of damage, the FTCA award must be reduced by the amount
of the PSODBA payments. See Pike v. United States,
652 F.2d 31, 34 (9th Cir. 1981). In Pike, the
Circuit refused to reduce an FTCA award by the amount of veteran's benefits
received by the plaintiff. The Circuit observed that while the FTCA award
did not include any sum for loss of financial support, the veteran's benefits
did cover that loss. In other words, the two awards were designed to compensate
for different elements of damage. Because the Government was not paying
for the same injury twice, the Circuit refused to reduce the FTCA award
by the amount of the veteran's benefits.
To apply Pike here, the Court must determine
whether the FTCA award and the PSODBA payments were designed to compensate
the plaintiffs for the same elements of damage. While it is clear that
the FTCA award covered both economic and noneconomic losses, the PSODBA
payments are tougher to categorize. The PSODBA statute and regulations
say nothing about whether benefit payments are designed to compensate
survivors for economic or noneconomic losses. While the original PSODBA
statute required proof of dependency by parents in order for parents to
receive an award, amendments deleted this requirement. This explains why
Darla Reber and Michael Oliver received PSODBA payments even though their
son Josh Oliver was not supporting them financially. In addition, there
is no requirement of economic need, and the payment is not tied in any
way to the deceased's salary, as were the veteran's benefits in Pike.
These are all clear indications that PSODBA payments are designed at least
in part to compensate for noneconomic losses.
The legislative history gives mixed signals. During the debate, legislators
referred to the survivors' financial distress caused by poor pension and
life insurance programs that local governments provided for public safety
officers, e.g. Congressional Record at 12007
(April 30, 1976), and also referred to the need to compensate survivors
for the "loss of companionship. " Id.
at 12011.
When this legislative history is read together with the statute itself,
it sounds like Congress decided to pay PSODBA benefits to help survivors
with economic and noneconomic losses. It is impossible, however, to allocate
any benefit paid to an individual between these two elements of damage.
But an allocation is necessary for two reasons: (1) The FTCA award to
Darla Reber and Michael Oliver covered only noneconomic losses, and thus
any portion of the PSODBA payment that was designed to compensate them
for economic losses cannot be subtracted from the FTCA award; and (2)
While the FTCA award compensates the Buttrams fully for their economic
losses, it does not do so for their noneconomic losses, and thus any portion
of the PSODBA payments that was intended to compensate the Buttrams for
their noneconomic loss cannot be subtracted from the FTCA award. The Court
will explain this further below, beginning with the Buttrams' case.
The FTCA award does not compensate the Buttrams fully for their noneconomic
loss because the Idaho cap on those damages reduced the award from $900,000
to $590,291.26 for both Deanna Buttram and Jeremiah Buttram. In other
words, each Buttram was shorted $309,708.74 in noneconomic loss. Without
the cap, the Government and the Kuna RFD would have divided responsibility
for that shortfall, with the Government responsible for 35%, or $108,398.06
for each Buttram.
It would seem particularly anomalous to require the Buttrams to return
their PSODBA payments, a portion of which was designed to compensate them
for noneconomic loss, when the FTCA judgment leaves part of that loss
uncompensated. There is nothing that ties the PSODBA payment to the Government's
liability limits - in fact, the Supreme Court has described the PSODBA
payment as a "gratuity." Rose v. Arkansas State
Police, 479 U.S. 1, 4 (1986). It is much more fair, and
more in keeping with the policy behind the PSODBA, to permit the Buttrams
to keep that portion of the PSODBA payments designed to compensate them
for noneconomic loss up to the amount of their noneconomic loss that is
not covered by the FTCA judgment, $108,398.06 each.
A different analysis applies to the Buttram's economic loss award. The
FTCA judgment was designed to fully compensate the Buttrams for their
economic loss, so that portion of the PSODBA payment representing compensation
for economic loss must be subtracted from the FTCA award for economic
loss.
This is not true, however, for Reber and Oliver, whose FTCA awards contained
nothing for economic loss. Thus, that portion of their PSODBA payments
representing compensation for economic loss do not constitute a double
recovery to Reber and Oliver. With regard to the FTCA award for noneconomic
loss, Reber and Oliver did not have their award reduced by the Idaho cap,
and thus they have no uncompensated loss here as did the Buttrams. Reber
and Oliver must therefore return that portion of the PSODBA payments representing
noneconomic loss.
This analysis shows that it is crucial to identify what portion of the
PSODBA payment was designed to compensate for economic loss, and what
portion was designed to compensate for noneconomic loss. The Buttrams
are entitled to keep that portion of the PSODBA payment representing noneconomic
loss, but must return that portion representing economic loss. It is exactly
the opposite for Reber and Oliver: They must return that portion of the
PSODBA payments representing noneconomic loss, but are entitled to keep
that portion representing economic loss.
However, as crucial as apportionment is, the Government cannot make an
apportionment. There is simply no way to allocate the PSODBA payment between
economic and noneconomic loss. It is the Government's motion, and hence
the Government's burden to show that it is paying twice for the same injury.
The Government cannot carry its burden, and thus the Court must deny the
motion. see footnote #1
Order
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set out above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to amend (docket no.
236) is hereby DENIED.
Dated this 12th day of August, 1999.
/s/ B. LYNN WINMILL
CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
footnote
footnote #1 While
there was some briefing addressing whether the PSODBA payment
was a collateral source, the parties eventually recognized that
the payment came from the Government and hence was not a collateral
source as far as the Government was concerned under Idaho law,
Idaho Code § 6-1606. In other circumstances, state collateral
source rules have been applied to the Government in FTCA cases
where (1) the payment comes from a specially funded source distinct
from the unsegregated general revenues of the Federal Treasury,
see U.S. v. Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (
9th Cir. 1960), or (2) the plaintiff contributed to the Government
payment. See Overton v. U.S., 619 F.2d
1299 (8th Cir. 1980). There is no evidence that either of these
circumstances is present here.
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